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[So F. No. 19062. In Bank. Oct. 29, 1954.] 
COUN'l'Y OF SAN'rA CLARA, Appellant, v. HAYES 
COMP ANY (a Corporation), Respondent. 
lla,lbl Counties-Charters-Validity-Mode ot Attacking.-A 
county charter which has been put into effect can only be 
attacked in quo warranto proceedings; it cannot be attacked 
in action against newspaper publisher for mispublications of 
charter prior to election in which voters approved charter. 
Limitation of Actions-Suspension of Statute-Prevention 
From Taking Action.-Running of statute of limitations is 
suspended during any period in which plaintiff is legally pre-
vented from taking action to protect his rights . 
. (3J Counties-Actions-Limitation of Actions.-Where county was 
confronted with choice of assuring damages against newspaper 
publisher for mispublications of charter by failing to submit 
charter to Legislature for approval or attempting to avoid 
any damage by putting charter into effect, it should not, by 
very act of attempting to prevent damage from such pub-
lisher's wrong, lose benefit of rule tolling statute of limitations 
while its action against publisher was barred. 
[41 Id.-Actions-Limitation of Actions.-County may not reason-
ably be held responsible for delay incident to attacking charter 
in quo warranto proceedings where such proceedings were 
promptly instituted by the People on relation of a third party. 
[5] Id.-Actions-Limitation of Actions.-Two-year statute of 
limitations (Code Civ. Proc., § 339, subd. 1), if applicable to 
county's action against newspaper publisher for damages re·· 
suIting from mispublications of county charter prior to elec-
tion in which voters approved charter, was tolled from date 
charter went into effect until it was determined to be invalid 
by decision of Supreme Court. 
[6] Pleading-Theory of Action.-A plaintiff alleging relevant 
facts is under no duty to adopt any particular legal theory of 
recovery. (CodeCiv. Proc., § 426, subd. 2.) 
[7] Counties - Actions - Pleading. - Where damages alleged in 
county's action against newspaper for mispublications of pro-
posed county charter might reasonably be anticipated, allegs· 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Limitation of Actions. § 160; Am.Jur., Limita-
tion of Actions, § 237 et seq. 
[6] See Cal.Jur., Pleading, ~ 35; Am.Jur., Pleading, §§ 81, 82. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Counties, § 4~ [2] Limitation of 
Actions, § 109; [3-5] Counties, § 153; [6] Pleading, § 52; [1, 9] 
Counties, § 156; [8] Pleading, § 90. 
, 
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tions thereof are equally consistent with both contract and 
tort recovery. (Civ. Code, §§ 3300, 3333.) 
[8] Pleading - Demurrer - Uncertainty. - Where uncertainty of 
complaint does not arise out of allegations of relevant facts 
but out of legal effect thereof, plaintiff may not be required 
to resolve such uncertainty on demurrer and is entitled to seek 
any relief consistent with facts alleged. 
[9] Oounties-Actions-Pleading.-Whether gravamen of county's 
cause of action against newspaper publisher for damages for 
mispublications of proposed county charter is in tort or in 
contract may be determined, if necessary, when and if pllb-
lisher pleads or seeks to prove facts that might constitute 
defense to breach of contract or negligence. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa 
Clara Oounty. M. G. Del Mutolo, Judge. Reversed~ 
Action by county against owner of newspaper for damages 
arising out of defective publication of contents of proposed 
county charter. Judgment for defendant reversed. 
Howard W. Campen, County Counsel (Santa Clara), and 
Donald K. Currlin, Assistant County Oounsel, for Appellant . 
. Campbell, Custer, Warburton & Britton, Austen D. War-
burton and Edwin J. Owens for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J .-Plaintiff has appealed from a judgment 
of dismissal entered after it declined to amend its first amended 
complaint following the sustaining of a demurrer. In its 
first cause of action plaintiff alleged that it orally contracted 
with defendant for the latter to publish in its newspaper _ ... 
a proposed county charter for 10 days before the election 
of November 2, 1948. Owing to defendant's negligence the 
publications of September 17th, 18th, 19th,' 20th and 21st 
were so defective.' that the charter was invalidated in qu~ 
warranto proceedings commenced a few weeks after the charter 
went into effect on July 1, 1949. These proceedings were 
terminated by a decision of this court on May 28, .1951. On 
or about September 27, 1948, defendant filed its affidavit with 
plaintiff that the charter had beell published for 10 days. 
and plaintiff did not discover that five of the publications 
were defective until November 10, 1948, after the charter 
had been approved by the voters. In May, 1949, plaintiff 
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and approved. PlailltifI seeks to recover the expenses it 
incurred in the preparation of the charter and its presentation 
to the voters. In its second cause of action plaintiff realleged 
the facts stated in its first cause of action and also alleged 
that the oral contract had been reduced to writing by de-
fendant on September 30, 1948. A copy of the writing, 
consisting of the bill sent by defendant to plaintiff for the 
publishing costs, was attached to the complaint. In its third 
cause of action plaintiff realleged the facts stated in its 
first cau~e of action and also alleged facts purporting to show 
that defendant was estopped to plead the statute of limita-
tions. Defendant demurred to each cause of action on the 
ground that it was barred by the provisions of subdivision 1 
of section 339 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and on th'e 
ground that it was uncertain, ambiguous and unintelligible. 
Section 339, subdivision 1, provides a two-year statute 
of limitations for an action "upon a contract, obligation or 
liability not founded upon an instrument in writing .... " 
Defendant contends that plaintiff's cause of action arose in 
September, 1948, when the mispublications occurred, and that 
since this action was not filed until November, 1951, it is barred 
by the two-year statute. Plaintiff contends, on the other 
hand, that the cause of action did not arise until this court 
affirmed the judgment invalidating the charter in 1951, and 
that in any event, either section 337, subdivision 1, or 
section 343 of the Code of Civil Procedure is the applicable 
section. It also contends that if the cause of action accrued 
at the time of the mispublications, the statute was tolled from 
July 1, 1949, to May 28, 1951, the period the charter was 
in effect. 
It is unnecessary to decide whether plaintiff's cause of 
action accrued when defendant failed properly to publish the 
charter, when plaintiff learned of the mispublications, or when 
the mispublications resulted in damage. Even if it is assumed 
that plaintiff's cause of action accrued at the earliest of these 
dates, the action was timely brought. 
In the light of the decision invalidating the charter (People 
v. Oounty of Santa Clara, 37 Ca1.2d 335 [231 P.2d 826]), 
it is clear that plaintiff would have been justified in not 
presenting the charter to the Legislature for approval at 
the 19~9 session. Had it followed that course nothing would 
have prevented it from immediately bringing an action against 
defendant for damages. Instead, however, plaintiff took the 
position that the mispublications were not sufficient to in-
) 
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vaJida1-,p the proceedings, and it succ('ssfully prevellted the 
superior court. from enjoining t.he certification of the charter 
to the Legislature. (Santa Clara Co'unty v. Snperior Court, 
33 Ca1.2d 552 [203 P.2d 1].) Thereafter the charter was 
approved by the Legislature, and it went into effect on July I, 
1949. [ia] Once the charter had been put into effect, how-
ever, it could only be attacked in quo warranto proceedIngs_ 
(Taylor v. Cole, 201 CaL 327,333,338-340 [257 P. 40]. and 
cases cited; see Amencan D·istl. Co. v. City Council of Sausa· 
lito, 34 Ca1.2d 660, 667 L213 P.2d 704, 18 A.L.R.2d 1247].) 
Under these circumstances the principle stated in Dillon v. 
Board of Pens'tOn Commrs., 18 Ca1.2d 427 [116 P.2d 37. 136 
A.L.R.800], is applicable. [2] "It is well recognized that 
the running of the statute of limitations is suspended during 
any period in which the plaintiff is legally prevented from 
taking action to protect his rights." (18 Ca1.2d at 431: see 
also Berger v. O'Hearn, 41 Ca1.2d 729, 733 [264 P.2d 10]; 
Estate of CaravQ,s, 40 Ca1.2d 33, 40 [250 P.2d 593] ; Judson v. 
Super'tor Court, 21 Ca1.2d 11, 14 [129 P.2d 3611 : Christ~n v. 
Superior Court, 9 Ca1.2d 526, 532-533 [71 P.2d 205, 112 
A.L.R. 1153]; Kinard v. Jordan, 175 Cal. 13, 15 [164 P. 
894] ; Marden v. Ba·ilard, 124 Cal.App.2d 458, 465 [268 P.2d 
809]; Marti'n v. Goggin, 107 Cal.App.2d 688, 690 r238 
P.2d 84] ; Burns v. Massachusetts etc. Ins. Co., 62 Cal.App.2d 
962, 970 [146 P.2d 24]; Wells v. California Tomato Juice, 
Inc., 47 Cal.App.2d 634, 638 [118 P.2d 916]; Archer v. 
Edwards, 19 Cal.App.2d 253, 256 [65 P.2d 115]; Estate 01 
Morrison, 125 Cal.App. 504, 510 [14 P.2d 102]; Elliott &-
Horne v.Chambers Land Co., 61 Cal.App. 310, 312 [215 P. 
99] ; Code Civ. Proc., § 356.) [ib] While the charter was 
in effect, plaintiff could not attack it in an actIon against 
defendant and thus could not establish damages flowing from 
the mispublications. 
It is contended, however, that since plaintiff could have 
avoided the bar of the rule against collateral attack of its 
charter by not submitting the charter to the Legislature for 
approval, it should not be allowed to rely on that bar now. 
[3] Plaintiff was not in a position, however, indefinitely to 
delay proceedings. (See Dillon v. Board of Pension Commrs., 
31lpra, 18 Ca1.2d 427, 430.) As was pointed out in Santa 
Clara County v. Superior Court, supra, 33 Ca1.2d 552, 554, 
plaintiff was required to submit the charter to the then current 
session of the Legislature, if it was to become effective at all. 
It was confronted with the choice of assuring damages by 
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failing to submit the charter or attempting to avoid any 
damage by putting it into effect. It would be anomalous if 
by the very act of attempting to prevent damage from de-
fendant's wrong, it should lose the benefit of the rule tolling 
the statute while its action was barred. (See Christin v. 
Superior Court, supra, 9 Ca1.2d 526, 532-533; Burns v. Massa-
chusetts etc. Ins. Co., S'ltpra, 62 Cal.App.2d 962, 969-971.) 
[4] Moreover, plaintiff may not reasonably be held respon-
sible for the delay incident to attacking the charter in quo 
warranto proceedings. Even if it is assumed that plaintiff 
could or should otherwise have instituted proceedings to 
test the validity of its charter, it was unnecessary for it to 
do so when, as in this case, quo warranto proceedings were 
. promptly instituted by the People on the relation of a third 
party. [5] We conclude, therefore, that the statute of 
limitations was tolled from the date the charter went into 
effect until the date it was finally determined to be invalid 
by the decision of this court. Accordingly, the action is 
not barred by the provisions of section 339', subdivision (1), 
of the Code of Civil Procedure. (See Estate of Carava.~. 
Sll,pra, 40 Ca1.2d 33, 42; Berger v. O'Hearn, supra, 41 Ca1.2d 
729, 733; Burns v. Massachu.setts etc. Ins. 00., supra, 62 Cal. 
App.2d 962, 970.) 
[6] Defendant contends that the demurrer was properly 
sustained for uncertainty, unintelligibility, and ambiguity on 
the ground that it cannot be determined whether plaintiff's 
action is in contract or in tort. In its first cause of action 
plaintiff alleged the relevant facts, and it was under no duty 
to adopt any particular legal theory of recovery. (Code Ci v. 
Proc., § 426, subd. (2) ; Cal'l:fornia W. S. L. Ins. 00. v. Tucker. 
15 Ca1.2d 69, 71 [98 P.2d 511] ; Oampbell v. Veith, 121 Cnl. 
App.2d 729, 731 [264 P.2d 141].) It is clear, however, that 
it stated a cause of action for the breach of an oral contraot. 
No purpose would be served by now determining whether 
the additional fact that the breach was negligent may permit 
plaintiff to pursue tort as well as contract remedies. (Sen 
Eads v. Marks, 39 Cal.2d 807, 810-812 [249 P.2d 2571.) 
[7] The action was brought within the shortest applicable 
period of limitations as extended, and since the damages 
alleged might reasonably be anticipated, the allegations ther('ot 
are equally consistent with both contract and tort recovery. 
(Civ. Code, § § 3300, 3333.) [8] The uncertainty, if any. 
does not arise out of the allegations of the relevant fa<lts, 
but out of the legal effect thereof. Plaintiff may not be 
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required to resolve such uncertainty on demurrer, however 
(see Bacon v. Wahrhaftig, 97 Cal.App.2d 599, 605 [218 P.2d 
144]; Juri v. Koster, 84 Cal.App. 298, 302 [257 P. 901j), 
and it is entitled to seek any relief consistent with the fact~ 
alleged. (Buxbom v. Sm.ith, 23 Ca1.2d 535, 542 [145 P.2d 
305] ; Keidatz v. Albany, 39 Ca1.2d 826, 829 [249 P.2d 264].) 
[9] Whether the gravamen of its cause of action is in tort 
or in contract may be determined if necessary,when and if 
defendant pleads or seeks to prove facts that might constitute 
a defense to breach of contract on the one hand or negligence 
on the other. 
Since plaintiff's first cause of action is good against the 
general and special demurrer, and since its second and third 
causes of action allege the same facts, the trial court also erred 
in sustaining the demurrer as to them whether or not the 
additional facts alleged therein are uncertain or immaterial. 
(Stafford v. Shu'uz, 42 Ca1.2d 767, 782 [270 P.2d 1] ; Bacon v. 
Wahrhaftig, supra, 97 Cal.App.2d 599, 605; Merlino v. West 
Coast Macaroni Mfg. Co., 90 Cal.App.2d 106, 108 [202 P.2d 
748] ; Aronson v. Bank of America Nat. T. &- 8. Assn., 42 
Cal.App.2d 710, 720-721 [109 P.2d 1001].) 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J 0, Shenk, J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
Schauer, J .. concurred in the judgment. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied November 
24, 1954. 
